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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SUDARSHAN JAYARAMAN: Earnings Volatility, Cash Flow Volatility and Informed 
Trading 
(Under the direction of Jeffery Abarbanell) 
 
 
 
I examine whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows 
provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed trading 
when public information is less informative, I find that bid-ask spreads and the probability of 
informed trading are higher both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and also when 
earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Additional tests suggest that managers’ 
discretionary choices that lead to smoother or more volatile earnings than cash flows, on 
average, garble information. However, I find that informed trading is attenuated in settings in 
which theory suggests that discretionary smoothing or volatizing of earnings is likely to be 
informative. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am indebted to my committee members Robert Bushman, Wayne Landsman, Mark 
Lang and Gunter Strobl, and especially to my dissertation chairman, Jeffery Abarbanell. I 
also appreciate helpful comments from Donal Byard, Hemang Desai, Scott Dyreng, Richard 
Frankel, John Hand, Doug Hanna, Chris Petrovits, Jana Raedy, Kartik Raman, Steve 
Stubben, Anjan Thakor, Kumar Venkataraman, S. Viswanathan, Wendy Wilson, and 
workshop participants at Baruch College, Southern Methodist University, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Washington University in St. Louis. I am grateful to Joel 
Hasbrouck and Soeren Hvidkjaer for sharing their data with me. 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES  vi 
LIST OF FIGURES vii  
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION    1 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT    9 
Earnings that are smoother than cash flows    9 
Earnings that are more volatile than cash flows  11 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN  13 
Accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV)  13 
Proxies for informed trading  14 
Bid-ask spread (SPREAD)  14 
Probability of informed trading (PIN)  15 
Sample  16 
IV. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS  18 
Preliminary evidence  18 
Correlations  19 
Multivariate regressions  20 
Firm-level determinants  20 
Regression specification and results  22
v 
 
V. PROACTIVE DISCRETION VERSUS NEUTRAL 
APPLICATION OF RULES  24 
 
Controlling for the influence of accounting rules  24 
Situations in which managerial discretion is informative  26 
VI. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS  29 
Effect of realization of ACEV on informed trading  29 
Role of insiders  31 
Existing proxies for income smoothing  31 
Alternate measure of bid-ask spread  32 
Addressing the possibility of serial correlation  32 
Other robustness tests  32 
VII. CONCLUSION  33 
APPENDICES  48 
REFERENCES  56
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table            
1. Descriptive statistics  35 
2. Correlations  36 
3. Multivariate regression of SPREAD on ACEV  38 
4. Multivariate regression of PIN on ACEV  39 
5. Relation between SPREAD and ACEV with controls for the influence  
of accounting rules  40 
 
6. Relation between SPREAD and ACEV during periods of extreme  
performance  41 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure            
1. ACEV and the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes  42 
2. Distribution of ACEV  43 
3. The relation between SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in the  
SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes according to the Less Informed 
Trading and More Informed Trading hypotheses  45 
 
4. Relation between informed trading (SPREAD and PIN)  
and ACEV  46 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ACEV   Accrual Component of Earnings Volatility 
ACEV*CFO_VOL Interaction of ACEV with CFO_VOL  
AGE   Number of years the firm exists on Compustat 
AMIHUD  Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity 
ANALYSTS  The number of analysts covering the firm 
CFO_VOL  Variance of cash flow from operations over five years scaled by assets 
EARNINGS_VOL Variance of five years’ annual earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by assets 
 
EXTREME Indicator variable set to 1 for firms with current-year annual stock 
return in the tenth (first) decile of annual stock return distribution in 
the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime 
 
INST   Percentage of institutional ownership 
LEV   Total debt scaled by assets 
MB   Market-to-book ratio 
PIN   Probability of Informed Trading 
PRC_INV  Inverse of stock price 
SIZE   Market value of equity 
SMOOTH  Regime where earnings are smoother than cash flows 
SPREAD  Bid-ask Spread 
TURN Annual turnover defined as the ratio of shares traded divided by shares 
outstanding 
 
VOLATILE  Regime where earnings are more volatile than cash flows 
 
 1  
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I investigate whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than 
cash flows provide or garble information for market participants. It is well understood that 
accounting rules such as the required matching of expenses and revenues are designed to 
smooth out fluctuations in cash flows and present a smooth stream of earnings (e.g., Dechow 
[1994]). Other accounting conventions, such as conservatism, and the inherent difficulty in 
predicting future cash flows can result in earnings that are more volatile than cash flows (e.g., 
Basu [1997], Dechow and Dichev [2002]). On the other hand, it is possible that earnings that 
are smoother than cash flows result from managers’ proactive discretionary choices, such as 
income smoothing (e.g., Leuz et al. [2003], Levitt [1998], Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
[2002], Arya et al. [2003]), while earnings that are more volatile than cash flows may result 
from discretionary choices such as “big baths” and timely loss recognition (e.g., 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002], Givoly and Hayn [2000], Ball and Shivakumar [2006], 
Turner [2001], Riedl [2004]). Thus, earnings that are either smoother or more volatile than 
cash flows may be due to either the neutral application of accounting rules and conventions, 
or to proactive discretionary choices, or both. Regardless of the underlying reason for 
smoother or more volatile earnings, an empirical question arises whether these outcomes 
either provide or garble information. 
I refer to the difference between the volatility of earnings and the volatility of cash 
flows as the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV). Using bid-ask spreads and the 
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probability of informed trading as proxies for informed trading, I find that when earnings are 
smoother than cash flows (i.e., for negative values of the accrual component), there is, on 
average, more informed trading. Similarly, when earnings are more volatile than cash flows 
(i.e., for positive values of the accrual component), there is, on average, more informed 
trading. These results suggest that earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash 
flows garble information and thus attract informed traders. Because earnings volatility can 
differ from cash flow volatility either because of accounting conventions or due to proactive 
period-by-period managerial discretion, I perform additional tests to parse out the individual 
effects of neutral application and proactive discretion. 
To establish my hypotheses, I rely on theories from information economics that link 
the informativeness of public information to informed trading (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 
[1980], Verrecchia [1982], Diamond [1985], Easley and O’Hara [2004], Baiman and 
Verrecchia [1996]). These theories predict that the informational advantage of informed 
traders, and therefore the level of informed trading, is inversely related to the informativeness 
of public disclosure.1 Following prior research in market microstructure, I use bid-ask 
spreads and the probability of informed trading as proxies for the level of informed trading. 
According to the above theories, if earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash 
flows provide information, then these reporting outcomes would be associated with lower 
bid-ask spreads and lower probabilities of informed trading. On the other hand, if earnings 
that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows garble information, then these reporting 
                                                 
1 I use the term public disclosure to correspond to the notion of disclosure in the analytical literature. Following 
Kim and Verrecchia [1994, pp. 43], I use the phrase provide information to indicate “public disclosure that 
ameliorates the adverse selection problem by partially or fully revealing to market makers information known 
by informed traders.” Similarly, I use garble information to indicate public disclosures that “stimulate informed 
judgments among traders who process public disclosure into private information. The ability of information 
processors to produce superior assessments of a firm’s performance on the basis of an earnings announcement 
provides them with a comparative information advantage over market makers (pp, 44).”  
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outcomes would be associated with higher bid-ask spreads and higher probabilities of 
informed trading. Alternatively, it is possible that these reporting outcomes are unrelated to 
informed trading.2 
Volatility of earnings is defined in this paper as the variance of five years’ earnings 
before extraordinary items, scaled by assets, and the volatility of cash flows as the variance 
of five years’ annual cash flow from operations, scaled by assets.  I use the difference 
between these two volatility measures, which is the accrual component or ACEV, to classify 
earnings as to whether they are smoother or more volatile than cash flows. Negative 
(positive) values of the accrual component indicate earnings that are smoother (more volatile) 
than cash flows.3 
The empirical results indicate that higher levels of informed trading are associated 
with more negative values of the accrual component (i.e., earnings that are smoother than 
cash flows). Further, higher informed trading is also associated with more positive values of 
the accrual component (i.e., earnings that are more volatile than cash flows). Informed 
trading is the lowest when the accrual component is close to zero (i.e., when earnings 
volatility is similar to cash flow volatility). The relation between the accrual component and 
                                                 
2 Prior studies have generally used associations with contemporaneous or future stock prices/returns (value-
relevance) to assess informativeness of reporting outcomes. While contemporaneous association-based studies 
might be intuitively appealing, they face the problem of correlated omitted variables, because these studies do 
not account directly for the mechanism through which information is impounded in stock prices. That is, do 
earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide information and directly impound 
information into stock prices, or do they garble information and thus attract informed traders who impound the 
private information into stock prices through informed trading? A related limitation of future stock 
price/returns–based associations is that they do not address the reasons that the ability of current earnings to 
predict future stock prices/returns is not arbitraged away. Informed trading, on the other hand, is based on 
informativeness of public information and does not rely on associations with future realizations.  
 
3 The characterization of earnings that are either smoother or more volatile than cash flows as the difference 
between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility (i.e., the second moment) is in the spirit of prior studies that 
characterize accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows (i.e., the first moment). In subsequent 
sections, I discuss the robustness of my results to alternate measures currently used in the literature. 
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informed trading is robust in a multivariate regression that includes controls for firm size, 
turnover, illiquidity, and the inverse of stock price.  
Having established the overall relation between informed trading and the accrual 
component of earnings volatility, I next examine the role of proactive discretion in the 
relation between informed trading and the accrual component. Studies in the accounting 
literature have allowed for the possibility that proactive discretion in the reporting process is 
aimed at either providing or garbling information. In a recent survey of more than 400 
corporate executives, Graham et al. [2005] find that an overwhelming majority of CFOs 
(97%) prefer to report smooth earnings, holding cash flows constant. The main reasons 
offered by survey participants for their preference for smooth earnings are the perception of 
lower risk, the lower cost of equity and debt, and improved earnings predictability by 
analysts. Prior research has not reached a consensus on whether income smoothing either 
provides or garbles information for equity market participants. While some researchers (e.g., 
Arya et al. [2003], Sankar and Subramanyam [2001], and Demski [1998]) argue that income 
smoothing is informative, other studies, regulators, and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Leuz et al. 
[2003], Levitt [1998], Lang et al. [2003], Bhattacharya et al. [2003], LaFond et al. [2007], 
and Barth et al. [2006]) suggest that income smoothing is an act of earnings management that 
garbles information.  
There is also no consensus in the literature on whether proactive discretionary choices 
that make earnings more volatile than cash flows reveal or garble information. While some 
researchers argue that big baths and timely loss recognition can be informative 
(Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002], Basu [1997], Givoly and Hayn [2000], Ball and 
Shivakumar [2006]), other studies and regulators contend that such reporting choices reflect 
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opportunistic behavior and can distort the information in earnings (Turner [2001], Riedl 
[2004]).  
I perform two tests to examine the role of proactive discretion in the relation between 
informed trading and the accrual component. First, I control for the effect of neutral 
application by including industry fixed effects to capture constant accounting rules and by 
incorporating additional controls such as leverage, market-to-book ratio, firm age, 
institutional ownership, analyst following, and cash flow volatility. As prior research (e.g., 
Dechow and Dichev [2002]) has shown that the accrual component is more likely to occur 
due to neutral application in firms with high cash flow volatility, I also include an interaction 
term of the accrual component with cash flow volatility. I find that the relation between the 
(stand-alone) accrual component and informed trading persists, consistent with the argument 
that proactive discretion contributes, on average, to the garbling of information and an 
increase in the level of informed trading. 
Second, I examine a situation in which theory suggests that proactive discretionary 
choices are likely to be informative. Exploiting the analysis of Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
[2002], in which big baths taken during periods of extremely poor performance and income 
smoothing during periods of extremely good performance perfectly reveal underlying cash 
flows, I investigate the relation between the accrual component and informed trading during 
periods of extreme performance. Consistent with their theory, I find that the relation between 
the magnitude of the accrual component and informed trading is attenuated during these 
periods, suggesting that proactive discretion does not always garble information and may in 
fact be informative when performance is extremely good or bad. 
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Because some theories argue that characteristics of the reporting environment and 
private information markets evolve endogenously as part of an overall equilibrium and are 
expected to be stable, I conduct additional tests to determine whether realization of the 
accrual component in every period affects informed trading. Results show that the most 
recent accrual component is positively associated with the following year’s informed trading 
after contemporaneous (i.e., this year’s) informed trading is controlled for. This suggests that 
realizations of the accrual component in a given year can affect the level of informed trading 
in future years.4  
Two additional tests explore how changes in the accrual component affect changes in 
bid-ask spreads. I compute changes from small magnitudes to more negative values of the 
accrual component (smoother earnings) and to more positive values of the accrual component 
(more volatile earnings). I then examine the relation between these changes and (i) future 
annual bid-ask spreads and (ii) earnings announcement (short-window) bid-ask spreads with 
controls for contemporaneous bid-ask spreads. Results indicate that changes in the accrual 
component from small magnitudes to more negative values and to more positive values are 
associated with higher incremental future annual spreads. In the case of the short-window 
test, changes from small magnitudes to more positive values are associated with larger 
incremental announcement spreads, whereas the relation between changes from small 
magnitudes to more negative values is insignificantly associated with incremental 
announcement spreads. I also find that when the accrual component does not change, there is 
no change in bid-ask spreads. On balance, these results suggest that the increase in informed 
trading for these firms occurs subsequent to the earnings announcement period.  
                                                 
4 The implicit inference is that changes in the accrual component are associated with changes in bid-ask spreads. 
In subsequent tests, I explicitly explore changes in the accrual component and changes in bid-ask spreads. 
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While the higher level of informed trading is consistent with a greater informational 
advantage for all informed traders, there is one group that deserves special attention, namely, 
insiders. Insiders are a subset of the group of informed traders who are endowed with private 
information due to their strategic association with the firm. In order to assess whether the 
relation between the accrual component and informed trading is driven by insider trading, I 
include the level of insider sales and purchases as an additional explanatory variable. Results 
show that the higher level of informed trading is due to informed traders external to the firm 
and not merely insiders.5 
This paper provides three contributions to the earnings informativeness literature. 
First, it uses theories from information economics to investigate whether earnings that are 
smoother or more volatile than cash flows either provide or garble information. Second, by 
examining the relation between informed trading and managerial discretion, it provides 
evidence regarding whether reporting choices such as income smoothing and big baths are 
informative or whether they garble information. Finally, this study also contributes to the 
market microstructure literature by elucidating the mechanism through which reporting 
outcomes impound information into stock prices. (See Easley and O’Hara [2004] for a call 
towards an understanding of the ways that properties of accounting information affect 
informed trading.) 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis 
development, followed by the research design in section 3. In section 4 I describe the primary 
results, and in section 5 I report the results of tests exploring the individual effects of 
                                                 
5 Aboody et al. [2005] find that firms with low earnings quality have high levels of insider trading. Similarly, 
Frankel and Li [2004] find more insider trading in firms whose financial statements are less value-relevant. To 
the extent that more informed trading is associated with the accrual component, earnings affected by the accrual 
component can be considered, on average, to be of “low quality.” 
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proactive managerial discretion and the influence of accounting rules. Section 6 investigates 
a number of extensions and robustness tests, and section 7 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Theories of endogenous information acquisition hold that the incentives to acquire 
private information are inversely related to the informativeness of public information 
(Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], Verrecchia [1982], Diamond [1985]). Further, theories argue 
that incentives to exploit existing private information are also inversely related to the 
informativeness of public information (Baiman and Verrecchia [1996], Easley and O’Hara 
[2004]). The relation between informed trading and earnings that are smoother or more 
volatile than cash flows depends on the extent to which the reporting outcomes either provide 
or garble information. 
 
EARNINGS THAT ARE SMOOTHER THAN CASH FLOWS 
The preference of financial markets for smooth earnings is evident from a recent 
survey of corporate executives by Graham et al. [2005], who find that approximately 97% of 
respondents prefer to report smooth earnings, holding cash flows constant. The results of this 
study are suggestive, but they do not directly address the empirical question of how investors 
interpret smoother earnings.6 
                                                 
6 Some prior studies have emphasized how the neutral application of accounting rules such as the matching of 
expenses and revenues naturally leads to accruals smoothing out fluctuations in cash flows. For example, 
Dechow [1994] argues that one of the objectives of accruals is to smooth out the fluctuations in cash flows and 
thereby present a smooth stream of earnings. Similarly, earnings can be smoother than cash flows due to the 
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Prior academic research has not reached a theoretical or empirical consensus on 
whether earnings that are smoother than cash flows provide or, rather, garble information. 
For example, Arya et al. [2003] argue that by smoothing earnings, managers remove the 
transient portion of earnings and communicate the permanent portion, thereby enabling 
equity markets to arrive at an efficient estimate of the firm’s stock price. Chaney and Lewis 
[1995] argue that income smoothing plays an informational role, as it is high-valued, rather 
than low-valued, firms that smooth income. In Sankar and Subramanyam [2001], a risk-
averse manager smoothes reported earnings to smooth his consumption, revealing his private 
information about future earnings in doing so. A similar idea is developed in Demski [1998], 
who suggests that a hard-working manager is able to better predict future earnings, which 
will enable her to smooth reported earnings. On the other hand, other studies find that 
choices such as income smoothing are acts of earnings management that garble information. 
For example, Leuz et al. [2003] find that managers in economies with more private benefits 
of control use income smoothing to conceal firm performance from outsiders. In a well-
publicized speech on earnings management, former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt remarked 
(Levitt [1998]), “In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth 
earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation. Trickery 
is employed to obscure actual financial volatility.” Other studies find that firms that cross-list 
in better investor-protection regimes and those that adopt international accounting standards 
indulge in less income smoothing (Lang et al. [2003], Barth et al. [2006]). 
If earnings that are smoother than cash flows provide information, they will be 
associated with less informed trading because private information has been publicly revealed. 
                                                                                                                                                       
exercise of proactive discretion in the form of income smoothing, where managers purposefully make reported 
earnings smoother than cash flows in every period. 
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I call this the Less Informed Trading (L) hypothesis. On the other hand, if earnings that are 
smoother than cash flows garble information, they will be associated with more informed 
trading. I call this the More Informed Trading (M) hypothesis.7 It is also possible that 
earnings smoother than cash flows are unrelated to informed trading. My two-sided 
hypothesis therefore is as follows: 
 
H1 (L): Less informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows.  
H1 (M):  More informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows. 
 
EARNINGS THAT ARE MORE VOLATILE THAN CASH FLOWS 
There is also no consensus in the literature regarding whether earnings that are more 
volatile than cash flows either provide or garble information.  These reporting outcomes 
could be due to neutral application of accounting rules and conventions such as conservatism 
(Basu [1997]) and the inherent difficulty of predicting future cash flows (Dechow and 
Dichev [2002]) or due to proactive discretion such as big baths (Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
[2002]), timely loss recognition (Givoly and Hayn [2000], Ball and Shivakumar [2006]), and 
choices that entail increasing and subsequently reversing earnings without a corresponding 
change in cash flows. While some studies argue that earnings that are more volatile than cash 
flows reveal private information (Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002], Basu [1997], Givoly 
and Hayn [2000], Ball and Shivakumar [2006]), other studies conclude that earnings that are 
more volatile than cash flows do not reveal private information, but rather reflect 
opportunistic behavior (Turner [2001], Riedl [2004]). However, no study has examined 
                                                 
7 It is possible that earnings that are smoother than cash flows provide information but are associated with more 
informed trading because public and private information are complements (e.g., Lundholm [1988], Manzano 
[1999], Indjejikian [1991]). Although I perform additional tests to investigate this possibility, and I cannot 
conclusively rule out this interpretation. 
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whether earnings that are more volatile than cash flows affect informed trading.8  My two-
sided hypothesis therefore is the following: 
 
H2 (L): Less informed trading occurs when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. 
H2 (M): More informed trading occurs when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. 
 
                                                 
8 A related paper, LaFond and Watts [2006], investigates whether accounting conservatism is associated with 
past, current and future information asymmetry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
ACCRUAL COMPONENT OF EARNINGS VOLATILITY (ACEV) 
To measure the degree to which earnings are smoother or more volatile than cash 
flows, I use the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility (Gu [2005]). 
This characterization (i.e., the second moment) is in the spirit of prior studies that represent 
accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows (i.e., the first moment). For 
convenience, I refer to the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility as 
the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV). Thus, 
)1()()( CFVarEVarACEV −=  
The variance of five years’ annual earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by 
assets (EARNINGS_VOL) is the proxy for earnings volatility, or Var(E). The proxy for the 
volatility of cash flows, Var (CF), is the variance of five years’ operating cash flows, scaled 
by assets (CFO_VOL).9  Equation (1) shows that when ACEV = 0, earnings volatility equals 
cash flow volatility [i.e., Var (E) = Var (CF)]. When ACEV < 0 (i.e., for negative values of 
ACEV), earnings are smoother than cash flows.10 When ACEV > 0 (i.e., for positive values of 
ACEV), earnings are more volatile than cash flows. These scenarios are depicted in figure 1. 
                                                 
9 Results based on standard deviations of these variables are similar. 
 
10 The advantage of ACEV is that it captures the combined effect of the cash flow–accrual covariance 
(Cov(CF,AC)) and the variance of accruals (Var(AC)) to represent a comprehensive measure of income 
smoothing (Gu [2005]). It is clear from eq. (1) that neither Cov(CF,AC) nor Var(AC) in isolation can determine 
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<< Insert figure 1 about here >> 
 
The SMOOTH regime comprises earnings that are smoother than cash flows. I 
multiply values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime by −1 so that larger values of ACEV 
indicate larger accrual components. The VOLATILE regime comprises earnings that are more 
volatile than cash flows. The horizontal line (ACEV = 0) represents the instances in which 
earnings volatility equals cash flow volatility.  
 
PROXIES FOR INFORMED TRADING 
The proxies I use to measure informed trading are the bid-ask spread (SPREAD) and 
the probability of informed trading (PIN).  
 
BID-ASK SPREAD (SPREAD) 
The relation between the extent of informed trading and bid-ask spreads was first 
discussed in Bagehot [1971]. Bagehot argues that market makers trade with two kinds of 
traders—informed and uninformed. While the market maker loses to informed traders, he 
recoups these losses from uninformed traders by increasing the bid-ask spread. Thus, a high 
level of informed trading leads to higher bid-ask spreads. Bagehot’s intuition has been 
subsequently modeled by Copeland and Galai [1983], Kyle [1985], and Glosten and Milgrom 
[1985]. 
 There are many measures of bid-ask spreads commonly used in the literature. 
However, Hasbrouck [2005] finds a high degree of correlation (above 0.9) among these 
                                                                                                                                                       
whether earnings are smoother or more volatile than cash flows. In additional tests reported in section 6.3, I 
illustrate how the use of existing proxies of income smoothing such as the ratio of earnings volatility to cash 
flow volatility might lead to problematic inferences.  
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alternate measures. Since CRSP-based measures are available for a large sample of firms and 
over a long time period, I use them for my primary results. However, my results are robust to 
the alternate bid-ask spread measure of Hasbrouck [2005]. Following Amihud and 
Mendelson [1986], I define SPREAD as the annual relative bid-ask spread using daily closing 
bids and asks.11 Specifically, 
)2(
2/)(
)(1 ,
1 ,,
,,
,
, ∑ +
−=
tiD
NiNi
NiNi
ti
ti BIDASK
BIDASK
D
SPREAD  
where, Di,t is the number of days in year t for firm i for which closing bids and asks are 
available. 
 
PROBABILITY OF INFORMED TRADING (PIN) 
Easley and O’Hara [1992], and Easley et al. [1996], and Easley, Kiefer, et al. [1997] 
use a market-microstructure framework to construct a measure of the probability of informed 
trading (PIN) using trade data. The underlying parameters—the arrival rates of informed and 
uninformed traders and the probability of an information event—determine the likelihood 
that the market maker will transact with an informed investor. The higher the ratio of 
informed investors to uninformed investors, the higher the PIN. Easley et al. [2002] and 
Easley and O’Hara [2004] argue that PIN captures information risk (the market maker’s 
probability of trading with an informed trader) and depends on the mix of public versus 
private information. I use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a second proxy for the 
level of informed trading. PIN is more comprehensive than the extent of insider trading, 
because it incorporates trading by all kinds of informed traders: insiders endowed with 
                                                 
11 Results are identical when I use the effective spread defined by Stoll [2000] as the bid-ask spread scaled by 
price. 
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private information, and private-information arbitrageurs who acquire private information at 
a cost. Because theories state that anyone who has expended resources and gathered private 
information (or who is endowed with private information due to his/her association with the 
firm) is an informed trader, the definition of an informed trader is not necessarily restricted to 
either large institutions or to information intermediaries.  
 
SAMPLE 
As bid-ask spreads are available for a large number of firms and for a longer time 
period than PIN, I employ two distinct samples in the study, the SPREAD sample and the 
PIN sample.12 The SPREAD sample consists of 69,218 firm-year observations from 10,245 
firms in the non-regulated and non-financial services industries for the period 1988– 2005. 
The year 1988 was selected as the first year for the sample because cash flow variables are 
available only from 1987.13  The PIN sample comprises 18,625 firm-year observations for 
2,817 firms for the period 1988–2001 (the last year for which PIN data are available). 
For each year t, the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV) is defined as of 
the end of year t, while informed trading (SPREAD and PIN) is measured as of year t + 1. 
The control variables employed in the multivariate regressions are measured as of the end of 
year t. In appendix 1 I present a timeline for the measurement of the variables. 
The primary variables are the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV), the 
bid-ask spread (SPREAD), and the probability of informed trading (PIN). The mean ACEV is 
0.01, while the median is −0.0001. Computing ACEV based on standard deviations (instead 
                                                 
12 Results are robust to a common sample containing both SPREAD and PIN data. 
 
13 Although ACEV is based on the variance of five annual observations, those based on two observations or 
more (equivalent to earnings changes) are retained. None of my inferences is altered when the sample is 
restricted to ACEV based on five historical observations. 
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of variances) and imposing similar restrictions on the data as in Gu [2005] yields a median 
ACEV of −0.005, which compares closely with Gu’s median value of −0.007 (not tabulated). 
The mean (median) SPREAD is 4% (2%), which is similar to that reported in prior studies. 
Hasbrouck [2005], for instance, reports a mean Trade And Quote (TAQ) based spread of 
approximately 4% for his sample of randomly selected firms from 1993–2003, while Wahal 
[1997] reports a mean spread of 5.79% for a sample of NASDAQ firms for the period 1982–
1993. The mean spread of my sample for the Wahal time period is 6%. The mean PIN is 
0.20. When the sample is restricted to 1983–1998, the (unwinsorized) mean PIN is 0.19, 
which is similar to the 0.191 reported by Easley et al. [2002].  See table 1 for detailed 
descriptive statistics for the samples.  
 
<< Insert table 1 about here >> 
 
Approximately 33 percent of the SPREAD sample is centered around zero (figure 2, 
panel A), indicating that earnings volatility is similar to cash flow volatility for these firms. 
For about 45 percent of the PIN sample, earnings volatility is similar to cash flow volatility 
(figure 2, panel B). In appendix 2, I present a characterization of the accounting items 
underlying ACEV in the most SMOOTH and in the most VOLATILE deciles. Appendix 3 
provides a one-year and five-year transition matrix of ACEV.  
 
<< Insert figure 2 about here >> 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS 
 
Under the Less Informed Trading hypothesis, H1 (L), earnings that are smoother than 
cash flows (ACEV in the SMOOTH regime) are associated with less informed trading. Thus, I 
expect a negative relation between SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in the SMOOTH regime. On the 
other hand, under the More Informed Trading hypothesis, H1 (M), a positive relation is 
expected between SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in the SMOOTH regime. 
In the VOLATILE regime, I expect that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows 
(ACEV in the VOLATILE regime) will be associated with less informed trading under 
hypothesis H2 (L). I therefore predict a negative relation between SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in 
the VOLATILE regime. On the other hand, under H2 (M), I expect a positive relation between 
SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in the VOLATILE regime. These relations are shown in figure 3. 
 
<< Insert figure 3 about here >> 
 
1.1.  Preliminary evidence 
Results show that earnings that are smoother than cash flows (the leftmost deciles of 
figure 4) appear to be associated with larger bid-ask spreads, consistent with the More 
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Informed Trading hypothesis H1 (M). SPREAD is the lowest at the center of the distribution, 
where ACEV is close to zero (i.e., where earnings volatility is equal to cash flow volatility).14  
 
<< Insert figure 4 about here >> 
 
Moving from the center towards the rightmost decile of figure 4, we see that as 
earnings become more volatile than cash flows, SPREAD increases. Thus, earnings that are 
more volatile than cash flows appear to be associated with larger bid-ask spreads, consistent 
with the More Informed Trading hypothesis H2 (M). Similar patterns are depicted in figure 4, 
panel B, which plots values for PIN.  
 
CORRELATIONS 
Correlations between ACEV and SPREAD and between ACEV and PIN are 
statistically significant (table 2, panel A).15  There is a positive and significant correlation 
between SPREAD and ACEV (0.18) and also between PIN and ACEV (0.20) in the SMOOTH 
regime.16 Further, there is a positive and significant correlation between SPREAD and ACEV 
(0.11) and between PIN and ACEV (0.14) for firms in the VOLATILE regime. The accrual 
component of earnings volatility thus appears to be significantly associated with informed 
                                                 
14 Empirical results show that informed trading is the lowest around zero values of the accrual component. 
There was no reason, ex ante, to expect zero values of the accrual component to be the point at which informed 
trading was lowest or highest, nor was it necessarily expected that zero values of the accrual component would 
lead to the lowest or highest level of informed trading for all firms.  
 
15 All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, except as otherwise stated. 
 
16 Recall that values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been multiplied by −1, so the positive relation 
between ACEV and SPREAD, and ACEV and PIN, indicates that earnings that are smoother than cash flows are 
associated with larger SPREAD and PIN. 
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trading in both of these regimes, consistent with the More Informed Trading hypotheses H1 
(M) and H2 (M). 
 
<< Insert table 2 about here >> 
 
As correlations do not control for differences in innate characteristics between firms 
and over time, they should be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, an association between 
SPREAD and ACEV and between PIN and ACEV in univariate correlations suggests a first-
order relation between informed trading and the accrual component of earnings volatility. 
 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
In this section, I discuss variables related to SPREAD and PIN used in prior literature 
and incorporate them in a multivariate regression to ascertain whether the explanatory power 
of ACEV with respect to SPREAD and PIN is incremental to that of these firm-level 
characteristics.  
 
FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS 
Following prior research, I include market value of equity (SIZEi,t) because larger 
firms have less information asymmetry (Atiase [1985], Bamber [1987]).17 I also include 
proxies for the inventory component of spreads so that cross-sectional variation in spreads 
that remains can be interpreted as capturing the adverse selection component (Glosten and 
Harris [1988]). I use turnover (TURNi,t) as the proxy for liquidity. I include the Amihud 
[2002] measure of illiquidity AMIHUDi,t, defined as daily unsigned movements in stock 
                                                 
17 Defining SIZE as the book value of assets yields similar results. 
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returns divided by dollar trading volume. AMIHUD is a price impact measure and is highly 
related to the inventory component (Amihud [2002], Hasbrouck [2005]).18 Finally, I include 
the inverse of the stock price (PRC_INV) in the regression, as firms with lower stock prices 
have larger bid-ask spreads (Stoll [2000]).19  I report the results of this regression in table 3. 
Following Petersen [2005], I estimate the OLS regressions with year indicators and 
standard errors clustered at the firm level (table 3, panel A). The year indicators control for 
common shocks, which could cause cross-sectional correlation in the errors. The firm-level 
clustering of standard errors corrects for the possibility of serial correlation attributable to 
unobserved firm effects that cause serial correlation in the errors, as well as for serial 
correlation potentially arising from the fact that ACEV is based on five annual observations, 
with each earnings observation influencing both current and future ACEV. I also use robust 
regressions (table 3, panel B) as an additional specification to mitigate the effects of 
outliers.20 
 
<< Insert table 3 about here >> 
 
 
                                                 
18 As trading volume is measured differently between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ, in unreported robustness 
tests I split both TURN and AMIHUD into two variables—one for NYSE/AMEX and the other for NASDAQ 
(following Brennan et al. [1998])—and find similar results. 
 
19 I do not include stock return volatility as an additional control because the AMIHUD measure already 
contains the volatility of stock returns in the numerator. Although both AMIHUD and stock return volatility are 
highly correlated, I use the AMIHUD measure, as it explains a greater proportion of spreads than does stock 
return volatility.  Further, I do not include the number of trades as an additional control in the main specification 
because it is available only on the TAQ database, which would drastically reduce the sample size. However, in 
unreported robustness tests I include the number of trades for this smaller TAQ-based sample and find similar 
results. 
 
20 A robust regression uses iteratively reweighted least squares and assigns higher weights to better-behaved 
observations. See Baker and Hall [2004] for a description of robust regressions and their use. 
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REGRESSION SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
The multivariate regressions of informed trading (SPREAD and PIN) on ACEV in 
each of the regimes (SMOOTH and VOLATILE) are as follows: 
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In the SMOOTH regime (see table 3, panel A), the coefficient of ACEV is positive 
(0.21) and significant (t-statistic 8.20). Larger values of ACEV are associated with larger 
spreads, suggesting that earnings that are smoother than cash flows are associated with more 
informed trading. A one-standard-deviation (0.01) increase in ACEV is associated with a 21-
basis-point increase in bid-ask spreads. In the VOLATILE regime, there is a positive relation 
between SPREAD and ACEV, suggesting that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows 
are associated with larger bid-ask spreads. The coefficient of ACEV is 0.04 and the t-statistic 
is 7.62 (see table 3, panel A). A one-standard-deviation (0.07) increase in ACEV is associated 
with a 28-basis-point increase in bid-ask spreads. 
The positive relations between SPREAD and ACEV in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE 
regimes are robust to outliers (table 3, panel B). The coefficients of ACEV are positive (0.08 
and 0.02) and significant (t-statistics 15.76 and 9.16) in the robust regression for the 
SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes, respectively. The control variables have been scaled for 
exposition (SIZE by 106; AMIHUD by 104; MB, AGE, ANALYSTS, and TURN by 102; and 
INST by 101). The control variables are in the direction consistent with prior research. 
SPREAD is larger for smaller firms, less-liquid firms, and firms with lower stock prices. 
I also conduct OLS and robust regressions of PIN on ACEV and controls (table 4). 
Consistent with the intuition from the SPREAD results, there is a positive and significant 
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relation between PIN and ACEV in the SMOOTH regime. The coefficients of ACEV are 1.05 
and 1.14 and the associated t-statistics are 7.15 and 16.10 in the OLS and robust regressions, 
respectively.21 These results indicate that earnings that are smoother than cash flows are 
associated with higher probabilities of informed trading. A positive relation similarly obtains 
between PIN and ACEV in the VOLATILE regime. The coefficients of ACEV in the OLS and 
robust regressions (0.11 and 0.13, t-statistics 3.48 and 5.84, respectively) indicate that 
earnings that are more volatile than cash flows are associated with higher probabilities of 
informed trading. Results of the multivariate regressions thus confirm that the explanatory 
power of ACEV with respect to informed trading is incremental to underlying economic 
characteristics of the firm. 
 
<< Insert table 4 about here >> 
 
                                                 
21 Although the coefficients are greater than one, the confidence intervals vary from 0.76 to 1.34. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROACTIVE DISCRETION VERSUS NEUTRAL APPLICATION OF ACCOUNTING 
RULES 
Having established the overall relation between earnings that are either smoother or 
more volatile than cash flows and informed trading, I now investigate the roles of proactive 
managerial discretion versus neutral or conventional application of accounting rules in the 
relation between ACEV and informed trading. To disentangle these individual effects, I 
perform two tests. First, I attempt to control for the influence of accounting rules and 
evaluate whether the relation between ACEV and informed trading persists, thus providing 
evidence of either a dominant or incremental role for proactive discretion. Second, I examine 
a situation in which managerial reporting discretion is hypothesized to be informative and 
test whether the overall relation between ACEV and informed trading is attenuated, 
strengthened, or of no incremental importance. 
 
CONTROLLING FOR THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING RULES 
I include additional controls in the regressions to capture the influence of 
longstanding accounting rules and choices on the relation between ACEV and informed 
trading. My modified two-sided hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3 (L): When the influence of accounting rules is controlled for, managerial discretion is 
associated with less informed trading. 
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H3 (M): When the influence of accounting rules is controlled for, managerial discretion is 
associated with more informed trading. 
 
I include industry fixed effects using two-digit SIC codes to capture constant 
accounting rules, and I incorporate additional firm factors to capture the interaction between 
accounting rules and the underlying economic characteristics of the firm. These are leverage 
(LEVi,t); the market-to-book ratio (MBi,t); firm age (AGEi,t), defined as the number of years 
the firm has been listed on Compustat; institutional holding (INSTi,t), defined as the 
percentage of firms’ shares held by institutions based on data from the 13-F filings; analyst 
following (ANALYSTSi,t), defined as the number of analysts following the firm, obtained 
from I/B/E/S; and reported cash flow volatility (CFO_VOL).  
Prior studies argue that accruals naturally smooth out fluctuations in cash flows and 
present a smooth stream of earnings (see, e.g., Dechow [1994)). Thus, earnings that are 
smoother than cash flows are expected to arise naturally (i.e., due to accounting rules) in 
firms with high cash flow volatility. Further, studies show that difficulty in estimating future 
cash flows in highly volatile environments leads to greater estimation errors in accruals 
(Dechow and Dichev [2002]). One consequence of greater estimation errors is that earnings 
become more volatile than cash flows due to the reversing nature of accruals. As larger 
values of ACEV are more likely to occur due to accounting rules in firms with high cash flow 
volatility, I interact ACEV with CFO_VOL (ACEV*CFO_VOL) and include this interaction 
term as an additional control. The stand-alone coefficient of ACEV can now be interpreted as 
the role of managerial discretion. The extended regression specification is 
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 Results of the relation between ACEV and SPREAD with controls for the influence of 
accounting rules (table 5) show that inferences based on SPREAD and PIN are similar (for 
parsimony I report only the SPREAD results). In the SMOOTH regime, the stand-alone 
coefficients of ACEV are positive (0.45 and 0.16) and significant (t-statistics 8.60 and 13.54) 
in the OLS and robust regressions, respectively. Similarly, ACEV is positive and significant 
in both regressions in the VOLATILE regime. Because ACEV is positively related to informed 
trading in the presence of controls for accounting rules, I interpret these results as evidence 
that proactive discretionary reporting choices, on average, contribute to rather than mitigate 
the overall relation between ACEV and informed trading, consistent with hypothesis H3 (M). 
This evidence is consistent with cross-country studies like Bhattacharya et al. [2003] and 
LaFond et al. [2007].22  
 
<< Insert table 5 about here >> 
 
SITUATIONS IN WHICH MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IS INFORMATIVE 
I next exploit the analysis in Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] to investigate 
settings in which theory suggests that managerial discretion plays a role and, in particular, is 
                                                 
22 Bhattacharya et al. [2003] and LaFond et al. [2007] find that income smoothing is associated with lower 
liquidity in the equity market. LaFond et al. [2007] decompose income smoothing into non-discretionary and 
discretionary components and find that the discretionary component lowers liquidity. This paper finds 
consistent evidence in a single country (i.e., U.S.) setting where economy-wide and institutional variables are 
held constant. Moreover, in subsequent tests, I extend the tests by exploring specific situations in which theory 
predicts that managerial discretion is informative. Results indicate that the relation between informed trading 
and income smoothing is attenuated in these settings. Thus, this paper also provides evidence that there are 
situations where managers use discretion in the reporting process to provide information to market participants.  
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informative. Specifically, I explore the relation between ACEV and SPREAD during periods 
of extreme performance (results based on ACEV and PIN are similar). According to 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002], investors infer the precision of reported earnings and 
managers take a big bath when the firm experiences a sufficiently negative outcome, while 
managers smooth income when the firm experiences a positive (or a less negative) outcome. 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad’s model predicts a pooling equilibrium for periods of moderate 
performance and a separating equilibrium for big baths (income smoothing) during periods of 
extremely bad (good) performance. Thus, big baths (i.e., ACEV in the VOLATILE regime) 
during extremely bad performance and income smoothing (i.e., ACEV in the SMOOTH 
regime) during extremely good performance are both expected to reveal information about 
underlying cash flows. Results based on PIN are similar.  
I measure firm performance using the current year’s annual stock returns (RET). I 
denote extreme performance by setting the indicator variable EXTREME to 1 for firms in the 
SMOOTH regime with returns in the tenth decile (extremely good performance). Similarly, I 
set EXTREME to 1 for firms in the VOLATILE regime with returns in the first decile to 
denote extremely bad performance (inferences based on quartiles are similar but slightly 
weaker in statistical significance). To capture the impact of extreme performance on the 
relation between SPREAD and ACEV, I interact ACEV with EXTREME and define this term 
as ACEV*EXTREME. As income smoothing and big baths are expected to be informative 
during periods of extremely good and poor performance respectively, I expect the relation 
between ACEV and SPREAD to be attenuated during these periods, that is, I expect 
ACEV*EXTREME to be negative.  
 28  
As predicted, in the SMOOTH regime, the coefficients of ACEV*EXTREME are 
negative and significant in the OLS and robust regressions (−0.21 and −0.10, t-statistics 
−4.52 and −8.89, respectively; see table 6). This indicates that income smoothing during 
periods of extremely good performance is associated with relatively less informed trading. In 
the VOLATILE regime, the coefficient of ACEV*EXTREME is insignificant in the OLS 
regression but negative and significant in the robust regression (−0.01, t-statistic −2.20), 
indicating that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows during extremely poor 
performance are associated with less informed trading.23 These results suggest that the 
relation between informed trading and the accrual component is attenuated in situations in 
which managerial discretion is expected to be informative. Thus, while the overall relation 
between ACEV associated with proactive discretion and informed trading suggests that 
earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows on average, tend to garble 
information, it appears that proactive discretion can in certain contexts be informative.  
 
<< Insert table 6 about here >> 
 
                                                 
23 The interaction term ACEV*EXTREME is negative and significant in both the SMOOTH and VOLATILE 
regimes in the PIN results. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
EFFECT OF REALIZATION OF ACEV ON INFORMED TRADING 
Some theories argue that characteristics of the information environment and private 
information markets evolve endogenously and remain stable in equilibrium. In such an 
equilibrium, one would not expect realization of the accrual component to have any effect on 
informed trading. However, it is an empirical question whether the realization of ACEV in a 
given period alters the level of informed trading. I conduct two tests relevant to this question. 
First, I examine whether the accrual component is associated with next year’s 
informed trading after controlling for this year’s level of informed trading. If the accrual 
component has no relation to future informed trading incremental to contemporaneous 
informed trading (measured as of the same period as the most recent ACEV), this would 
suggest that new realizations of the accrual component have very little effect on the level of 
informed trading in any given year. In unreported tests, I find that ACEV as of year t is 
significantly associated with SPREAD and PIN as of year t + 1, after controlling for SPREAD 
and PIN as of year t.24 
Second, I examine whether changes in ACEV are related to changes in bid-ask 
spreads. I do not expect a monotonic relation between changes in ACEV and short-window 
spreads. This is because an increase in ACEV could be associated with smaller or larger
                                                 
24 The coefficient of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime is 0.08 and the t-statistic is 5.19 with controls for 
contemporaneous SPREAD, compared to a coefficient of 0.21 in the main specification.  
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spreads depending on whether it makes earnings less smooth or more volatile than cash 
flows. I partition the sample into quintiles of ACEV, where quintile 1 denotes the most 
negative ACEV and quintile 5 denotes the most positive ACEV. I compute changes in ACEV 
between quintile 3 and quintile 2 (change in earnings is smoother than cash flows), between 
quintile 3 and quintile 4 (change in earnings more volatile than cash flows) as well as 
between quintile 3 and quintile 3 (no change).25  I then explore the relation between changes 
in ACEV and (i) future annual bid-ask spreads and (ii) earnings announcement bid-ask 
spreads, with controls for contemporaneous bid-ask spreads.26 I find that changes in ACEV 
from small magnitudes to more negative values and from small magnitudes to more positive 
values are associated with changes in future annual bid-ask spreads. Further, changes in 
ACEV from small magnitudes to more positive values are significantly associated with 
changes in earnings announcement spreads. The relation between changes in ACEV from 
small values to more negative values is insignificantly related to short-window bid-ask 
spreads. Finally, I find that when the accrual component does not change, there is no change 
in bid-ask spreads. 
 
 
                                                 
25 I exclude observations in the extreme quintiles for two reasons. First, there are very few observations that 
move from quintile 3 to the extreme quintiles. Second, observations in the extremes might have a differential 
relation with informed trading, as seen in the prior section.  However, including these observations does not 
alter the inferences. 
 
26 There are certain caveats. First, the accrual component is based on five annual earnings observations, and so 
the notion of an earnings expectation and an earnings realization, and hence the appropriateness of an event-
study, is unclear. Second, it is not clear that the announcement/10-K filing period is the only time when 
informed traders acquire and/or trade on their private information. Further, there is ambiguity about the 
announcement period. As studies state that cash flow information is publicly available only after the 10-K has 
been filed, I define the short window from the date of the release of the earnings announcement until five days 
after the date of the filing of the 10-K with the SEC. Based on a random sample of one hundred firm-year 
observations, the average difference between the earnings announcement date and the filing date is thirty-five 
days. Hence, the short-window for the entire sample is taken as forty days. Defining the end date as three days 
after the filing date yields similar results.  
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ROLE OF INSIDERS 
 While my hypotheses are based on the behavior of all informed traders, I explore 
whether the relation between the accrual component and informed trading is driven by 
insider trading (as suggested in Baiman and Verrecchia [1996]). I include the level of insider 
trading (defined as the total of insider sales and purchases) as an explanatory variable. I find 
that higher levels of informed trading are due to informed traders external to the firms as well 
as insiders. For example, in the SMOOTH regime, the coefficient of ACEV in the PIN 
regression declines from 1.05 to 1.03 with controls for insider trading (the coefficient for 
insider trading is 0.01 and the t-statistic is 5.29). 
 
EXISTING PROXIES FOR INCOME SMOOTHING 
I also explore the relation between informed trading and an existing proxy for income 
smoothing—the ratio of earnings volatility to cash flow volatility (RATIO).  In unreported 
tests, I find a positive relation between informed trading and RATIO; that is, firms with 
smaller values for RATIO have less informed trading. This might lead one to conclude that 
income smoothing is associated with less informed trading. However, decomposing RATIO 
indicates that it is the ratio of ACEV and cash flow volatility (CFO_VOL). As firms with 
more cash flow volatility have more informed trading (Kyle [1985], Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam [1998], Copeland and Galai [1983]), inferences based on RATIO are 
confounded by CFO_VOL. Because high CFO_VOL is associated with more informed 
trading and low ACEV is associated with less informed trading (figure 2), the relation 
between RATIO and informed trading is influenced by the relations between ACEV and 
informed trading and between CFO_VOL and informed trading.   
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 ALTERNATE MEASURE OF BID-ASK SPREAD  
Hasbrouck [2005] develops a Gibbs estimate of bid-ask spreads based on Roll [1984]. 
I find that my results are insensitive to this measure. The coefficients of ACEV are positive 
and significant in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes and for the OLS and robust 
regressions.  
 
 ADDRESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIAL CORRELATION  
Although the standard errors are clustered by firm, I employ a cross-sectional 
regression to ensure that my results are unaffected by serial correlation. The cross-sectional 
regression uses the firm-level mean of each variable across all years in the sample and 
contains only one observation per firm. The coefficients of ACEV are positive and significant 
in the SPREAD and PIN samples, in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes, and for the OLS 
and robust regressions.  
 
 OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
The main results are robust to the use of standard deviations instead of variances to 
compute ACEV; the calculation of variances based on ten observations instead of five; the 
definition of earnings as operating income or net income; the use of effective spreads; the 
computation of ACEV for the pre-1987 period using the balance sheet; the estimation of 
ACEV as the residual of a regression of earnings volatility on cash flow volatility; and the 
inclusion of the level of accruals as an additional control.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper investigates whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash 
flows—and, specifically, reporting choices such as income smoothing and big baths—
provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed trading 
when public information is less informative, I find that the difference between earnings and 
cash flow volatility is associated with a larger bid-ask spread and a higher probability of 
informed trading. More informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows 
as well as when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Further, I find consistent 
evidence in a changes specification where changes in earnings that are smoother than cash 
flows and in earnings that are more volatile than cash flows are significantly associated with 
changes in informed trading. 
 I also explore the extent to which the relation between the accrual component and 
informed trading is due to individual effects of proactive managerial discretion and/or 
application of conventional accounting rules. I find that the above-mentioned relations with 
informed trading persist when additional controls intended to capture the influence of 
accounting rules are included. This suggests that managers’ exercise of proactive discretion 
in the form of income smoothing and big baths, contributes on average to the garbling of 
information and reinforces the relation between the accrual component and informed trading. 
However, in a setting in which theory suggests that managerial discretion is informative (i.e., 
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extreme performance), the relation between the accrual component and informed trading is 
attenuated. This suggests that proactive discretion can be informative in certain contexts. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
ACEV represents the accrual component of earnings volatility, defined as the difference between the variance of 
earnings and the variance of cash flows. Earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
data item 18) scaled by assets (data item 6), while cash flow represents cash flow from operations (data item 
308) scaled by assets. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread (defined as the closing ask minus the closing bid 
divided by the average of closing ask and bid). PIN stands for the probability of informed trading. SIZE denotes 
the market value of equity (data item 199 multiplied by data item 25) in $ millions. TURN is annual turnover, 
defined as the ratio of shares traded divided by shares outstanding (data item 25). AMIHUD is the Amihud 
[2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the amount of total debt (data 
item 9 plus data item 34) scaled by total assets. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio, defined as the ratio of 
the market value of assets (data item 199 times data item 25 plus data item 6 less data item 60) divided by the 
book value of assets (data item 6). AGE is the number of years the firm exists on Compustat. The percentage of 
institutional ownership is denoted by INST. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts covering the firm. CFO_VOL 
denotes variance of cash flows (data item 308). 
 
 Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. Std. Dev.
Primary variables  
ACEV 0.01 -0.22 -0.002 -0.0001 0.004 0.40 0.05
SPREAD 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.34 0.06
PIN 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.46 0.08
Firm-level characteristics  
SIZE 1475.90 1.90 28.48 117.63 594.54 36977.81 4935.00
TURN 1.17 0.03 0.36 0.74 1.46 7.20 1.28
AMIHUD 6.45 0.00 0.01 0.20 2.39 152.82 20.90
PRC_INV 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.25 2.35 0.37
LEV 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.36 0.94 0.21
MB 2.07 0.56 1.08 1.46 2.26 11.79 1.82
AGE 12.62 2.00 4.00 9.00 18.00 50.00 11.07
INST 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.47 0.95 0.27
ANALYSTS 6.20 0.00 0.00 2.00 9.00 44.00 9.04
CFO_VOL 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.22 0.03
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more 
volatile) than cash flows. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the 
Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is debt scaled by total 
assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio. AGE is the number of years the firm exists on Compustat. INST is the 
percentage of institutional ownership. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts covering the firm. CFO_VOL 
represents cash flow volatility. All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Correlations marked with an 
asterisk (*) are not significant. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been multiplied by −1. See 
table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables.  
 
Panel A: Correlation between ACEV, SPREAD, and PIN  
 
ACEV  
(SMOOTH) 
ACEV  
(VOLATILE) SPREAD PIN 
ACEV  
(SMOOTH) 1.00    
ACEV  
(VOLATILE) – 1.00   
SPREAD 0.18 0.11 1.00  
PIN 0.20 0.14 0.45 1.00 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
Panel B: Correlation between ACEV and firm-level determinants 
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ACEV  
(SMOOTH) 1.00              
ACEV  
(VOLATILE) – 1.00             
SPREAD 0.18 0.11 1.00            
PIN 0.20 0.14 0.45 1.00           
SIZE -0.10 -0.10 -0.19 -0.40 1.00          
TURN 0.06 0.12 -0.25 -0.34 0.05 1.00         
AMIHUD 0.11 0.08 0.59 0.33 -0.09 -0.18 1.00        
PRC_INV 0.23 0.23 0.57 0.37 -0.16 -0.15 0.60 1.00       
LEV -0.06 -0.03 0.13 0.06 0.01 -0.13 0.07 0.07 1.00      
MB 0.15 0.17 -0.13 -0.22 0.11 0.26 -0.11 -0.06 -0.18 1.00     
AGE -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.21 0.28 -0.17 -0.06 -0.14 0.04 -0.13 1.00    
INST -0.18 -0.15 -0.40 -0.39 0.13 0.21 -0.24 -0.36 -0.05 0.01* 0.25 1.00   
ANALYSTS -0.15 -0.09 -0.34 -0.49 0.49 0.24 -0.20 -0.29 -0.01 0.07 0.24 0.58 1.00  
CFO_VOL 0.81 0.36 0.12 0.16 -0.10 0.11 0.06 0.22 -0.10 0.33 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 1.00 
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Table 3: Multivariate regression of SPREAD on ACEV  
 
The dependent variable is the bid-ask spread (SPREAD). ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. 
SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows SIZE 
denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of 
illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. The regressions include year indicators and robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been 
multiplied by −1. Although the relation between SPREAD and ACEV is based on a two-sided hypothesis 
[hypotheses H1 (L) and H1 (M) for the SMOOTH regime and hypotheses H2 (L) and H2 (M) for the VOLATILE 
regime], the positive prediction for ACEV is based on the preliminary evidence in figure 4, panel A. See table 1 
for detailed definitions of the  variables. 
 
Panel A: OLS regression 
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH 
(n = 37,249) 
VOLATILE 
(n = 30,676) 
 
Predicted 
sign Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.03 13.08 0.04 11.35 
ACEV + 0.21 8.20 0.04 7.62 
SIZE – -0.73 -23.47 -0.86 -19.58 
TURN – -0.48 -28.14 -0.49 -25.91 
AMIHUD + 0.10 24.54 0.09 28.39 
PRC_INV + 0.05 23.09 0.05 30.20 
Adjusted R2  0.53  0.52  
 
 
Panel B: Robust regression  
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH 
(n = 37,249) 
VOLATILE 
(n = 30,676) 
 
Predicted 
sign Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.02 14.11 0.03 14.09 
ACEV + 0.08 15.76 0.02 9.16 
SIZE – -0.40 -26.77 -0.55 -22.92 
TURN – -0.21 -31.50 -0.24 -27.86 
AMIHUD + 0.18 344.84 0.15 264.41 
PRC_INV + 0.05 142.18 0.03 94.25 
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Table 4: Multivariate regression of PIN on ACEV 
 
The dependent variable is the probability of informed trading (PIN). ACEV is the accrual component of earnings 
volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. 
SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of 
illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. The regressions include year indicators and robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been 
multiplied by −1. Although the relation between PIN and ACEV is based on a two-sided hypothesis (hypotheses 
H1 (L) and H1 (M) for the SMOOTH regime and hypotheses H2 (L) and H2 (M) for the VOLATILE regime), the 
positive prediction for ACEV is based on the preliminary evidence in figure 4, panel B. See table 1 for detailed 
definitions of the  variables. 
 
Panel A: OLS regression 
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH 
(n = 11,392) 
VOLATILE 
(n = 7,111) 
 
Predicted 
sign Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept  0.23 33.40 0.22 42.07 
ACEV + 1.05 7.15 0.11 3.48 
SIZE – -5.33 -22.47 -5.13 -19.38 
TURN – -4.38 -19.99 -3.68 -17.82 
AMIHUD + 0.06 2.79 0.08 5.98 
PRC_INV + 0.08 6.60 0.04 6.30 
Adjusted R2  0.36  0.35  
 
 
Panel B: Robust regression  
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH 
(n = 11,392) 
VOLATILE 
(n = 7,111) 
 
Predicted 
sign Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.22 33.91 0.21 37.01 
ACEV + 1.14 16.10 0.13 5.84 
SIZE – -4.71 -42.38 -4.61 -33.62 
TURN – -3.36 -31.70 -2.88 -22.22 
AMIHUD + 0.04 4.23 0.09 11.13 
PRC_INV + 0.11 22.24 0.05 13.21 
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Table 5: Relation between SPREAD and ACEV with controls for the influence of accounting rules  
 
The dependent variable is SPREAD, the bid-ask spread. ACEV is accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which 
earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] 
measure of illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the amount of leverage, scaled by total assets. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio. 
AGE is the number of years the firm exists on Compustat. The percentage of institutional ownership is denoted by INST. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts 
covering the firm. CFO_VOL represents cash flow volatility. ACEV*CFO_VOL is the interaction of ACEV with CFO_VOL. The regressions include two-digit 
SIC code indicators, year indicators, and robust standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been 
multiplied by −1. The predicted sign for ACEV is indeterminate, because the relation between SPREAD and the stand-alone coefficient of ACEV with controls for 
the influence of accounting rules is based on a two-sided hypothesis [hypotheses H3 (L) and H3 (M)]. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the  variables. 
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH 
(n = 37,249) 
VOLATILE 
(n = 30,676) 
 OLS regression Robust regression OLS regression Robust regression 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.04 6.08 0.03 15.19 0.05 7.53 0.04 13.94 
ACEV +/– 0.45 8.60 0.16 13.54 0.05 6.94 0.02 7.87 
SIZE – -0.06 -1.30 -0.09 -4.80 -0.14 -2.42 -0.17 -6.24 
TURN – -0.35 -19.49 -0.16 -23.10 -0.34 -17.12 -0.16 -18.37 
AMIHUD + 0.10 24.66 0.18 351.38 0.09 28.48 0.16 289.93 
PRC_INV + 0.04 18.53 0.03 89.88 0.04 23.52 0.02 65.72 
LEV + 0.01 6.96 0.01 4.02 0.02 12.71 0.01 11.54 
MB – -0.20 -12.04 -0.12 -24.59 -0.20 -13.49 -0.11 -18.02 
AGE – -0.02 -10.20 -0.01 -16.86 -0.02 -7.30 -0.01 -12.60 
INST – -0.15 -14.73 -0.06 -16.12 -0.18 -13.58 -0.10 -17.21 
ANALYSTS – -0.04 -13.62 -0.02 -18.60 -0.04 -11.34 -0.02 -13.32 
CFO_VOL + 0.06 2.74 0.04 8.85 0.12 7.40 0.06 11.33 
ACEV*CFO_VOL +/– -2.27 -7.64 -0.95 -14.56 -0.60 -4.75 -0.25 -6.34 
Adjusted R2  0.56  –  0.55  –  
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Table 6: Relation between SPREAD and ACEV during periods of extreme performance 
The dependent variable is SPREAD, the bid-ask spread. ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which 
earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. EXTREME is an indicator variable set to 1 for firms with a annual stock return in the tenth (first) decile of 
the annual stock return distribution in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime. ACEV*EXTREME is the interaction of ACEV with EXTREME. SIZE is the market 
value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is leverage. MB 
is the market-to-book ratio. AGE is the number of years the firm exists on Compustat. INST is the percentage of institutional ownership. ANALYSTS is the 
number of analysts covering the firm. CFO_VOL represents cash flow volatility. ACEV*CFO_VOL is the interaction of ACEV with CFO_VOL. The regressions 
include two-digit SIC code indicators, year indicators, and robust standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH 
regime have been multiplied by −1. The positive predicted sign for ACEV is based on the results in table 5. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
  ACEV regime 
 SMOOTH (n = 37,249) VOLATILE(n = 30,676) 
 OLS regression Robust regression OLS regression Robust regression 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.03 6.05 0.03 15.05 0.05 7.49   
ACEV + 0.49 9.52 0.18 15.58 0.03 4.69 0.01 5.77 
ACEV*EXTREME – -0.21 -4.52 -0.10 -8.89 0.01 0.13 -0.01 -2.20 
EXTREME +/– -0.01 -13.51 -0.01 -13.65 0.03 24.54 0.02 37.83 
SIZE – -0.08 -1.66 -0.09 -5.01 -0.11 -1.91 -0.16 -5.76 
TURN – -0.30 -16.62 -0.14 -19.88 -0.40 -20.24 -0.18 -21.31 
AMIHUD + 0.10 25.08 0.18 355.76 0.09 28.92 0.16 292.77 
PRC_INV + 0.04 18.87 0.03 95.48 0.04 22.65 0.02 62.80 
LEV + 0.01 7.26 0.01 4.67 0.02 11.16 0.01 10.65 
MB – -0.15 -9.08 -0.10 -20.19 -0.13 -8.50 -0.08 -13.27 
AGE – -0.02 -10.10 -0.01 -16.73 -0.02 -5.68 -0.01 -11.30 
INST – -0.16 -15.36 -0.06 -16.60 -0.15 -12.11 -0.09 -16.03 
ANALYSTS – -0.04 -14.69 -0.02 -19.73 -0.04 -12.60 -0.03 -14.78 
CFO_VOL + 0.05 2.70 0.04 8.79 0.07 5.02 0.04 8.32 
ACEV*CFO_VOL +/– -2.27 -7.64 -0.96 -14.67 -0.44 -3.68 -0.18 -4.77 
Adjusted R2  0.57  –  0.57  –  
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Figure 1:  ACEV and the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes 
 
ACEV denotes the accrual component of earnings volatility. Var (E) represents the variance of annual earnings 
before extraordinary items scaled by assets. Var (CF) is the variance of cash flow from operations over five 
years, scaled by assets. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) 
than cash flows. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of ACEV 
 
SPREAD denotes the relative bid-ask spread. PIN is the probability of informed trading. ACEV is the accrual 
component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more 
volatile) than cash flows. The values of ACEV in the SMOOTH regime have been multiplied by −1. See table 1 
for detailed definitions of the variables. 
 
Panel A:  SPREAD sample 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of ACEV (cont’d.) 
 
Panel B:  PIN sample 
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Figure 3:  The relation between SPREAD/PIN and ACEV in the SMOOTH and 
VOLATILE regimes according to the Less Informed Trading and More Informed 
Trading hypotheses 
 
SPREAD denotes the relative bid-ask spread. PIN is the probability of informed trading. ACEV is the accrual 
component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more 
volatile) than cash flows. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Figure 4:  Relation between informed trading (SPREAD and PIN) and ACEV 
 
SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread. PIN is the probability of informed trading. ACEV is the accrual 
component of earnings volatility. The horizontal axes plot ACEV deciles and the vertical axes plot deciles of 
SPREAD (panel A) and PIN (panel B). SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother 
(more volatile) than cash flows. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
 
Panel A:  SPREAD and ACEV 
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Figure 4:  Relation between informed trading (SPREAD and PIN) and ACEV (cont’d.) 
 
Panel B:  PIN and ACEV 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of variable definitions 
 
ACEV denotes the accrual component of earnings volatility. EARNINGS_VOL measures the variance of five 
years’ annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by assets. CFO_VOL is the variance of cash flow from 
operations over five years, scaled by assets. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. 
AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC_INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the 
amount of leverage. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio. AGE is the number of years the firm exists on 
Compustat. INST is the percentage of institutional ownership. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts covering the 
firm. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread. PIN stands for the probability of informed trading. See table 1 for 
detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Appendix 2: Accounting items associated with ACEV in the most SMOOTH and most 
VOLATILE deciles 
 
To provide better intuitions about ACEV, I identify accounting items that cause a 
mismatch between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, 
thereby possibly leading to large absolute values of ACEV (in the extreme SMOOTH and 
VOLATILE deciles). For example, large capital expenditures increase depreciation expense 
for the year and make earnings more volatile than cash flows in the year they are incurred. 
Further, large increases in working capital such as accounts receivable (due to credit sales) 
and accounts payable (credit purchases) lead to fluctuations in income without a 
corresponding impact on cash flows. In contrast, large reductions in accounts receivable (due 
to customer payments) affect cash flows with no corresponding effect on income. However, 
reductions in accounts receivable due to write-offs affect earnings but not cash flows. 
Another example of a mismatch is profit/loss on sale of property, plant and equipment, which 
affects earnings before extraordinary items but does not affect cash flow from operating 
activities. 
In categorizing the items, I make the following assumptions.  (i) Items that affect the 
balance sheet (income statement) and represent more than 10% (5%) of total assets are 
considered.  (ii) “Capex” refers to capital expenditures incurred during the year. (iii) Profit or 
loss on sale of property, plant and equipment is classified as “Profit/loss on sale of PPE.” (iv) 
Income from discontinued operations and extraordinary income are classified under 
“Discontinued operations.” (v) Unrealized income or losses from unconsolidated subsidiaries 
are reported as “Noncash share of subsidiary.” (vi) Changes in accounts receivables (AR) and 
changes in inventory are classified into increases, decreases, and decreases with an 
accompanying charge to special items. The rationale is that if accounts receivable or 
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inventory reductions are accompanied by a charge to special items, they might indicate write-
offs. (vii) Changes in accounts payable (AP) are classified under a single category. (viii) 
Amortizations classified as special items are categorized separately. (ix) Other amortizations 
(such as customer acquisition expenditures) that are considered operating expenses are 
shown as “Amortization—operating.” (x) Items affecting the balance sheet (B/S) but not the 
income statement (I/S) (such as cumulative translation adjustments, deferred compensation, 
etc.) are classified under “Items affecting B/S and not I/S.” This category includes changes in 
current deferred assets. (xi) “Other special items” indicates charges to special items that have 
not been considered in (iii), (vi), or (viii) above. (xii) The category “Narrowly beat analyst 
forecast” includes instances in which the firm beats the median analyst forecast by less than 
one cent. Although meeting or missing analyst forecasts would not by itself lead to larger 
absolute values of ACEV, this category captures incentives to smooth earnings or to take 
earnings baths.  
In panels A and B below I present the frequency of the above items for the most 
SMOOTH and most VOLATILE deciles respectively. Earnings that are smoother than cash 
flows are associated with the following:  periods of capital expenditures (14% of the time); 
increases in accounts receivable (14%), presumably due to increases in sales; periods of 
beating the median analyst forecast by less than one cent (14%); changes in accounts payable 
(11%); and increases in inventory (10%). 
Accrual components that make earnings more volatile than cash flows are associated 
with capital expenditures (16% of the time); changes in accounts payable (15%); increases in 
accounts receivable (8%); increases in other special items (8%); profit/loss on sale of 
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property, plant and equipment (7%); decreases in accounts receivable accompanied by a 
special item (7%); and beating analyst forecasts (7% of the time). 
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Panel A: Most SMOOTH decile 
 
 
Panel B: Most VOLATILE decile 
 
 
The values of ACEV in both the deciles are associated with periods of growth, as 
evidenced by capital expenditures and changes in accounts payable. However, increases in 
accounts receivable are more common among firms with earnings that are smoother than 
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cash flows (14%) than among firms with earnings that are more volatile than cash flows 
(8%). Increases in inventory are also more common for the most SMOOTH decile (10%) 
compared to the most VOLATILE decile (4%). The percentage of firms that smooth earnings 
and narrowly beat analyst forecasts is higher (14%) than the percentage that make earnings 
more volatile than cash flows and narrowly beat analyst forecasts (7%). Finally, decreases in 
accounts receivable accompanied by a special item (7%) are more prevalent among firms 
with more volatile earnings than among those with smoother earnings (1%). 
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Appendix 3: Transition matrix of ACEV 
 
ACEV denotes the accrual component of earnings volatility. The quintiles are formed on the basis of the values of ACEV:  the first quintile (MOST SMOOTH) 
comprises observations with earnings that are the smoothest relative to cash flows, while the fifth quintile (MOST VOLATILE) consists of observations with 
earnings that are the most volatile relative to cash flows.  
 
Panel A: One year later 
  ACEV quintiles in year t + 1 
 
 Most SMOOTH 2 3 4 
Most 
VOLATILE Missing Total
Most SMOOTH 0.60 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.13 1.00 
2 0.13 0.46 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.12 1.00 
3 0.04 0.17 0.45 0.17 0.04 0.13 1.00 
4 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.46 0.12 0.15 1.00 
ACEV 
quintiles 
in year t 
Most VOLATILE 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.60 0.22 1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Five years later 
  ACEV quintiles in year t + 5 
 
 Most SMOOTH 2 3 4 
Most 
VOLATILE Missing Total
Most SMOOTH 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.56 1.00 
2 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.55 1.00 
3 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.56 1.00 
4 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.60 1.00 
ACEV 
quintiles 
in year t 
Most VOLATILE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.72 1.00 
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In panel A I report the quintiles that ACEV moves to in the following year, while in 
panel B I present the quintiles that ACEV moves to after 5 years. 60% of the observations in 
the extreme ACEV quintiles remain in that quintile one year later (panel A). Firms with 
persistently smoother earnings do differ from those with more volatile earnings. However, 
the percentage of observations in the MOST VOLATILE quintile that drop out of the sample 
(22%) is larger than in the MOST SMOOTH quintile (13%). There is a high level of attrition 
in the sample (panel B): almost half of the sample drops out over five years. The percentage 
of drop-outs is higher for the MOST VOLATILE quintile (72%) than for all the other 
quintiles. Firms with persistently smooth earnings (13%) are more frequent than those with 
that are more volatile earnings (10%). 
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